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Neoliberalising Bioethics: Bias, Enhancement and Economistic Ethics 
 
1 KEAN BIRCH
 
Abstract 
 
In bioethics there is an ongoing debate about the ethical case for human enhancement 
through new biomedical technologies. In this debate there are both supporters and 
opponents of human enhancement technologies such as genetic improvements of 
cognitive abilities (eg, intelligence). The supporters argue that human enhancement 
will lead to healthier and therefore better lives, meaning that any delays to the 
introduction of such technologies is problematic. In contrast, the opponents argue that 
new technologies will not solve problems such as inequality and social justice. In 
order to overcome opposition to human enhancement, Bostrom and Ord have outlined 
a test to evaluate ethical arguments for “status quo bias” or what they call “intuitive 
judgements” in the assessment of human enhancement. This article is a response to 
their paper in which I raise a number of problems with their position, particularly with 
their “status quo bias” test and the incorporation of economistic thinking into their 
ethical arguments. 
 
Introduction 
 
The credit crunch that has resulted from deregulated financial markets, limited 
government oversight, and collapsing stock prices raises serious questions about the 
underlying assumptions of neoclassical economics, especially in their neoliberal 
variants. Neoliberalism takes many forms, but can be simplistically defined as an 
assumption that the market should be the core organizing institution in society; the 
market is supposed to provide (self-interested) individuals with freedom (of choice) at 
the same time that it enables the efficient allocation of resources. As such, different 
varieties of neoliberalism are sustained by a “common normative logic” that seeks to 
establish totalizing market-based institutions that encourage individualistic behaviour 
extending across all social systems around the world.2 The spread of this “market 
ethic”, as David Harvey has characterized it, represents an ideological and political 
project highlighting the need to treat with suspicion the adoption or application of 
economic axioms to other areas of life, especially in the “fetish belief: that there is a 
technological fix for each and every problem”.3 
 
One area where such economistic thinking may prove problematic is in bioethical 
arguments in support of human enhancement technologies. Bioethics has been witness 
to numerous discussions about the nature of normal functioning and enhancement,4 
which have, more recently, shifted towards presenting the ethical case for promoting 
human enhancement through new technologies, especially genetic technologies.5 The 
supporters and opponents of human enhancement have been split - somewhat 
simplistically perhaps - between “posthumanists” and “bioconservatives”. A number 
of different people and groups can be identified as enhancement supporters 
(“posthumanists”) including the likes of Gregory Stock, Lee Silver, Nick Bostrom, 
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and Aubrey de Grey, as well as the Extropians, World Transhumanist Association 
(WTA), and Raelians.6 In bioethics, Carl Elliott identifies a number of major figures 
as supporters of human (especially genetic) enhancement including John Harris, 
Arthur Caplan, Glenn McGee and Julian Savulescu.7 The list of enhancement 
opponents (“bioconservatives”) ranges across the political spectrum and includes the 
likes of Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, George Annas, Jeremy Rifkin and Bill 
McKibben.8 
 
The ethical case for human enhancement is based on the idea that to delay new 
technologies – such as genetically enhanced intelligence – has a detrimental effect on 
our lives, which could be better, healthier and longer with such interventions. In 
contrast, opponents have raised concerns around distribution, inequality and social 
justice that the individualistic focus on technological solutions to social problems 
does not address. In a recent article for the journal Ethics,9 Bostrom and Ord have 
tried to present the difference between the two camps as merely a difference in 
preference for the “known” over the “new”: according to the authors, therefore, what 
is needed is “some way of adjudicating between the differing intuitions”.10 In their 
paper they present a test to assess ethical arguments for “status quo bias” by drawing 
upon insights in behavioural economics. In particular, they want to counter arguments 
resting on “intuitive judgements” uninformed by “relevant facts” in ethical 
considerations of human enhancement,11 especially in relation to the genetic 
enhancement of intelligence, such as those made by Leon Kass with regards to the 
“wisdom of repugnance”.12 They therefore argue that a “cognitive bias…may be 
responsible for much of the opposition to human enhancement in general and genetic 
enhancement in particular”.13  
 
This article is a response to Bostrom and Ord’s piece. Due to the limited space 
available for discussion, I focus on three specific problems with their argument, which 
I contend represents an example of the neoliberalisation of bioethics. First, I will 
analyse the two heuristic devices they present and raise a number of issues with them. 
Second, I will consider how the (partial) introduction of social scientific insights into 
their arguments has led them to construct an economistic ethic that incorporates 
certain problematic assumptions from neo-classical economic theory. More generally, 
supporters of human enhancement encounter such problems because their arguments 
are (and have to be) premised on the concept of individual choice – as opposed to the 
state intervention of eugenics – and would therefore be subject to market-based 
decision-making. This then leads to the third point: the adoption of economistic 
thinking in ethics has to adequately consider the problems associated with the 
externalities produced by individual self-interested actions (as accepted in such 
economistic thinking). In so doing, I want to reiterate the need to consider what I have 
previously termed “aggregate justice” in ethical arguments that centre on the 
individual in relation to human enhancement.14  
  
Whose Status Quo Bias? 
 
Bostrom and Ord contend that (bio)ethicists need to beware status quo biases in their 
arguments. They have constructed a heuristic device to identify such bias with the 
ostensible aim to remove bias from decision-making – at both individual and social 
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level – so that it is only informed by the “relevant facts”. According to Bostrom and 
Ord, the definition of a status quo bias is “an inappropriate (irrational) preference for 
an option because it preserves the status quo”.15 Although they provide this clear 
definition of status quo bias, the authors’ starting position is problematic in a number 
of respects. 
 
First, they do not acknowledge that people might have an “inappropriate” or 
“irrational” preference for something that is good for individuals or society, but which 
also preserves the current socio-economic context (eg, equality, which can sometimes 
inhibit individualistic – as opposed to individual – choices). Second, and following on 
from the last point, they do not enter into discussion about what is good or bad per se 
– and therefore should be promoted – but instead concentrate on changes “producing 
something worse”.16 This leaves aside the crucial question of how we assess whether 
something is good or bad. For example, if Bostrom and Ord had argued that a certain 
preference is in itself good – because it is rational to desire certain things (eg, 
equality) – this begs the question as to why “rational” preferences – ie, those based on 
“relevant facts” – are important since it would be better to determine a set of goods to 
promote in the first place. Third, they therefore seem to have started their argument 
with the assumption that there are a set of goods that are undisputed – eg, human 
enhancement – without exploring why these are important. In contrast, it would seem 
necessary to first consider why a thing itself (eg, equality, human enhancement etc) is 
good rather than develop a process for deciding which thing to choose through the 
creation of a heuristic device that can only consider the “rationality” of a decision. 
 
In summary, Bostrom and Ord have put a greater stress on the process of arriving at a 
decision rather than on the (good or bad) preference embodied in the decision itself. 
Furthermore, Bostrom and Ord’s argument does not consider how we evaluate 
whether something is good or bad since they focus explicitly on a linear evaluation of 
consequences (ie, “producing something worse”) in human enhancement (eg, laser 
eye treatment is better than contact lenses which is better than glasses). This leaves 
open a number of questions about the heuristic device Bostrom and Ord have called 
the “reversal test”. This test runs as follows: 
 
“When a proposal to change a certain parameter is thought to have 
bad overall consequences, consider a change to the same parameter 
in the opposite direction. If this is also thought to have bad 
consequences, then the onus is on those who reach these conclusions 
to explain why our position is such that it cannot be improved 
through changes to this parameter. If they cannot do so, then we 
have a reason to suspect that they suffer from a status quo bias”.17 
 
There are several initial problems with this test. First, it is based on conceptualizing 
each “parameter” as “continuous”,18 which would be hard to postulate unless there 
was a specific quantitative gradient upon which to measure it and therefore an 
assumed equilibrium or static point that represents a perceived “optimum” for human 
enhancement (eg, intelligent versus stupid). This would then mean that Bostrom and 
Ord start their argument with an assumed good to which we should strive or else we 
end up “producing something worse”. However, the assumed good has to be based 
upon present presumptions about what is “good” because we cannot know the future 
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consequences of our decisions or the environment in which their effects are felt. 
Consequently such assumed goods are liable to be biased to the “status quo” – eg, we 
currently think that being smarter is a good idea, but we only think so because our 
current situation rewards intelligence. Second, and more fundamentally, the heuristic 
device appears to fail a test of logic. Its premise is that: 
 
If (A) has an outcome (B) 
And (C) has the same outcome (B) 
Then (A) and (C) must be the same. 
 
Here A and C are presented as the same, rather than equally bad, because the test does 
not assess whether something is good or bad in itself. However, there is no reason to 
assume that A and C are qualitatively the same thing. For example, if enhancement 
leads to a certain outcome, as does degradation (both deliberate), they can lead to bad 
outcomes regardless of whether we perceive them as threatening a status quo position; 
eg, enhancement threatens equality, whilst degradation threatens justice. The only 
way they can be conceived qualitatively as the same thing is to assume that they exist 
upon a continuous gradient (eg, higher intelligence is better than lower intelligence, 
although it would be more apt to argue that intelligent ideas are better than less 
intelligent ideas rather than intelligence per se). Finally, it is difficult to see how we 
can expect in any decision-making process to be able to assess the “optimum” choice 
because we would need to assume that we have (or can have) access to complete 
information about all possibilities. This is a basic assumption in neoclassical 
economics, which reveals an underlying economistic approach that the authors have 
taken in their article. 
 
Bostrom and Ord present a second heuristic test, the “double reversal test”,19 which 
suffers from similar problems as the first. It can be characterized as follows: 
 
If a “natural” factor reduces capacity (A) having a bad outcome (B) 
And human intervention counterbalances (C) the bad outcome so that it is made 
“neutral” (D) 
And then if the “natural” bad outcome disappears (A1) and has a good outcome 
(E) because of the counterbalance (C) 
Then human intervention counterbalances (C1) the good outcome and has a 
neutral outcome (D1) 
If we cannot justify second counterbalance (C1) we should therefore intervene to 
produce good outcome (E) whether or not this is naturally reduced (A) or not. 
 
Again the authors have confused several different things to arrive at their heuristic 
device. They equate different consequences along a continuum, once again, which 
enables them to contend that certain impacts are better than others, ignoring the 
possibility that they are qualitatively different. Ironically, one of the main 
assumptions throughout these arguments is that the present (ie, “status quo”) is static 
in that it exists at a certain point on a scale. It has to be static for their arguments to 
work and to make the claim that “enhancement” (by definition) would be an 
improvement on the current situation. In contrast it would more reasonable to 
conceive of the present as a process that involves constant changes as people develop, 
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adapt and relate to one another, altering both the physical and social world as they do 
so. Thus, advocating enhancement can be seen as taking a socially conservative 
position in relation to the understanding of society, particularly when it is based on 
economic principles that do not challenge the existing neoliberal orthodoxy of 
individualistic choice in “free” markets.  
 
Economistic Ethics 
 
Bostrom and Ord have based their ethical arguments on a theory drawn from 
behavioural psychology and used to explain economic activity. However, they have 
only referred to part of the theory and have ignored an important aspect. Although 
they present the evidence of people’s preference for the “status quo”,20 they fail to 
mention why people have such a preference. This preference results from the 
difference between how people experience loss and gain. For example, Richard 
Layard – writing as an economist – argues that loss has twice the impact on people’s 
happiness, and their lives, as gain; therefore, loss-aversion has to be taken into 
account when considering (social) change.21 Unlike Bostrom and Ord, who see loss-
aversion as a problem with the “framing” of specific issues,22 the question of how 
people experience loss and gain would seem to be central to any ethical argument. 
Instead, by sidelining the issue of what constitutes good and bad, they do not need to 
address this aspect of the economic theory they seek to apply to bioethics and, in so 
doing, they incorporate an economistic approach in their arguments that is highly 
problematic. 
 
The partial application of this social science theory to ethics is important for a number 
of reasons. First, if Bostrom and Ord want to apply such concepts to ethical arguments 
they need to address the whole theory rather than apply it in a limited fashion because 
they then miss out crucial elements that have a bearing upon ethical debates. For 
example, would the disruption caused by supporting the introduction of genetic 
enhancement technologies at the expense of other research or social programmes be 
justifiable if the gain from the former is unknown? Second, even if conceptualized as 
continuous variables, loss and gain would seem to have a very different ethical value 
from one another: this means that they are not necessarily commensurate. Third, 
ignoring the effects of changes to happiness and social meanings is problematic 
because it stems from conceptualizing humans as rational, self-interested actors; that 
is, the Homo economicus of neoclassical economic theory. Thus, it is debatable 
whether the assumption of rational calculation in economic theory is an adequate way 
to make such ethical judgements. 
 
The adoption of rational calculation leads to an economistic ethic entailing a number 
of further problematic assumptions. First, we would need to assume that people have 
a choice over their health, which contradicts numerous studies pointing to the social, 
political and economic basis of health and well-being (eg, “postcode lottery” in 
healthcare).23 This is because the conceptualization of rational calculation requires 
that people indicate their preferences through their behaviour; for example, they 
choose better health by buying health insurance or private healthcare. In contrast, 
research on the social basis of health would suggest that the eradication of inequality 
would prove more beneficial than the introduction of enhancement technologies, 
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especially if such technologies were distributed through “free” markets. The 
constraints imposed by the current capitalist system (eg, profit accumulation) would 
not produce the results that enhancement supporters wish to promote since the spread 
of such technologies would be subject to price rather than need. 
 
Second, and more importantly, there is a subtle shift in emphasis from viewing the 
basis of behaviour as situated within social relationships (and therefore not purely 
individualized and rational) to viewing it as a consequence of our corporeality. For 
example, Bostrom and Ord argue that the genetic enhancement of particular traits (eg, 
intelligence) is the solution to “problems that [have] proved intractable to blind 
evolution” in that all we need to do is determine a “goal” before “working out what 
genetic modifications are necessary to attain it”.24 Thus, our behaviour is seen as a 
consequence of our individual biological bodies, whether they are enhanced or not, 
which would affect our perception of responsibility. It is useful here to consider 
Jonathan Glover’s distinction between logical and causal theories of responsibility; 
the former refers to an assessment based on action (eg, we give and therefore we are 
generous) and the latter to evaluations based on essentialist characteristics (eg, we are 
generous and therefore we give).25 Basing public policy and political economy on the 
latter view – as implied by enhancement supporters like Bostrom and Ord – leads to 
the view that people are incorrigible (eg, selfish, self-interested) and therefore that it 
is not possible to change their individual make-up since it is already fixed. Thus social 
change, including the amelioration of social problems, is no longer possible through 
social action, but only through self-interested individual decisions and the 
intervention of individually focused technological enhancements. 
 
Finally then, this adoption of a causal view of behaviour can be seen as both a 
consequence and a cause of the focus on the introduction of technological 
interventions to solve social and ethical problems. As such it represents a divergence 
from the “normative commitment to judging and changing human behaviour” which 
Cahill argues “is, after all, what defines ethics”.26 This produces a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in ethical arguments because certain arguments promote specific responses 
to ethical questions that foreclose other possibilities.27 For example, the promotion of 
technological enhancement is a costly enterprise that stretches across many years of 
basic research, product development and clinical testing: it is therefore only the target 
generation that receives the benefit, whereas social improvements would benefit all 
generations. To promote such intervention necessitates that there is support for these 
endeavours or they will fail. Enhancement supporters therefore have to promote 
technological solutions to social problems at the expense of other solutions in order 
for their ethical arguments to gain weight and hopefully bear fruit. However, this 
leads to the conceptualization of social problems in specific terms (ie, individualized 
and incorrigible views of behaviour) that naturalizes the ethical arguments they 
originally made, making them appear to be the only sensible option to pursue.28 
 
Economic Externalities and the Ethics of Enhancement 
 
Whilst there are some serious issues with adopting an economistic approach to 
bioethics, as I outlined above, the approach that Bostrom and Ord have adopted also 
entails an important and inherent contradiction. When considering the economic angle 
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that Bostrom and Ord have taken in their argument, it is evident that there is some 
confusion between person-affecting and impersonal views of harm.29 In order to 
explore this fuzziness in their argument it is useful to draw on another concept from 
economics, that of externalities. According to Milton Friedman these are “the effect 
of a transaction … on a third party who has not consented to or played any role in the 
carrying out of that transaction”.30 In short, an externality is the harm (and good) that 
an action has on those not directly involved in a transaction (or activity). For example, 
the enhancement of intelligence in children may produce a harmful (or negative) 
externality such as the need for higher taxation of adults to cover the necessary 
increased expenditure on education for enhanced children – meaning cuts elsewhere – 
whilst also a good (or positive) externality such as an increase in knowledge once the 
children are adults. However, it is important to consider how these externalities have 
different effects at the individual and aggregate scales. 
 
The first thing to consider is that a harmful (or negative) externality is beneficial for 
those directly involved in the activity because it enables certain costs involved in the 
activity to be passed onto other people. Such negative externalities can have both 
individual and aggregate effects. For example, intelligence enhancement benefits the 
person who is being enhanced (eg, better grades, job, etc) and the person providing 
the technology (eg, profits, extra research funding, etc); however, it can harm other 
individuals who lack the associated advantages of the enhancements as well as the 
aggregate population through increased educational expenditure, and cuts to other 
programmes, that are needed to support the enhanced person. In contrast, positive 
externalities are largely restricted to aggregate effects because any individual 
advantages are likely to be internalized as part of the transaction itself: that is, the 
transaction is a consequence of two parties seeking to gain an individual benefit from 
their activity (eg, better grades or job on the one hand and profit or research funding 
on the other). Along with bearing in mind these aspects of externalities, it is also 
crucial to remember that it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to accurately 
predict the aggregate effects of particular actions, whether they are meant to affect an 
individual or an aggregate population.31 
 
The preceding discussion relates to Bostrom and Ord’s arguments in a number of 
ways that illustrate the extent to which they have confused person-affecting and 
impersonal harms (and benefits). In producing an economistic ethic they have to make 
a person-affecting argument because of the underlying assumption in economic theory 
that individuals are both rational and self-interested. However, in seeking to avoid a 
status quo bias in their own arguments, they cannot justify their ethical position with 
the individual benefits of enhancement (eg, intelligence-enhanced people will have 
better lives than others), because such benefits are dependent upon the current context 
which rewards particular attributes. Instead they have to present the aggregate good 
(or externality) of enhancement as the basis for their moral argument (eg, society will 
be more productive as the result of intelligence enhancement). Their argument would, 
therefore, appear to be underpinned by person-affecting reasoning, but justified by an 
impersonal harm perspective. 
 
More problematically, however, Bostrom and Ord have extrapolated from the 
personal benefits of enhancement in their vision of the societal benefits that 
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enhancement would bring. This is necessary because there is no way to know what 
the aggregate effects of enhancement will be, whether they are positive, negative or 
both. For example, their argument depends on the assumption that enhanced people 
will lead better lives and therefore that it is ethical to pursue enhancement 
technologies at the aggregate population scale. However, the assessment of the 
benefits to each individual of enhancement technologies can only be made in relation 
to the current context because it is not possible to predict what would be advantageous 
in future contexts. In this sense, Bostrom and Ord have themselves given in to an 
analytic – as opposed to normative – status quo bias (ie, basing a judgement of the 
future on current trends).32 
 
The relationship between person-affecting and impersonal harms in Bostrom and 
Ord’s argument are further problematized when considering who will actually benefit 
from any change, specifically when it concerns human enhancement. The people 
affected by a change (ie, when there is no status quo bias) can only be considered in 
impersonal terms because they are not the same people as those who would not be 
affected by a change (ie, when there is a status quo bias). This results from Parfit’s 
“non-identity problem”.33 Those people who are changed (eg, enhanced) can only be 
conceptualized in impersonal terms because we cannot know what will benefit and 
harm future generations; we can only extrapolate from current trends. Furthermore, 
we cannot predict the future context of individuals, which may be radically different 
from our own, or the impact of socio-technical developments on individuals. In 
contrast, those people not affected by change (eg, non-enhanced) can be 
conceptualized in both impersonal and person-affecting terms because we can 
extrapolate from current benefits and harms they might encounter. Thus Bostrom and 
Ord’s argument rests on conceptualizing impersonal benefits for future generations 
that are derived from a totally different population set (ie, current generations) in 
person-affecting terms. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, I have previously argued that we need to consider 
human enhancement in terms of “aggregate justice” rather than person-affecting 
terms.34 The decisions of individuals, especially when conceptualized in economic 
(ie, self-interested and rational) terms, lead to problematic consequences for aggreg
populations. The discussion of externalities in the previous section further highlights 
these issues. Whilst negative externalities may impact on both individuals and 
populations, positive externalities are largely limited to population impacts. In this 
sense, any beneficial consequences of human enhancement would not provide 
benefits to individual people (eg, better work, well-being etc) because they would not 
be the same people who would have existed were there no enhancement. Rather, any 
positive impacts would only benefit the aggregate population and only in an abstract 
way (eg, greater production of knowledge). In contrast, the negative externalities of 
human enhancement would impact on both individuals and aggregate populations in 
that individual people would be at a disadvantage if they did not acquire 
enhancements and aggregate populations could suffer from the excessive costs of both 
developing new technologies and their subsequent implementation. 
ate 
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Recently the promotion of human enhancement (at least in the UK) – whether through 
genetic technologies or other means – has become a popular topic within think 
tanks,35 newspaper discussions,36 and academic conferences.37 Such discourses 
illustrate the desire to ameliorate social problems through technological interventions. 
Furthermore, these popularization efforts by enhancement supporters highlight that 
their aim is both a political and ethical agenda in that they seek to encourage the 
development and uptake of technological enhancement generally while 
simultaneously justifying these enhancements and their development as ethical 
choices. It is crucial to examine the theoretical underpinnings of these arguments 
because the incorporation of economistic thinking in our reasoning raises several 
concerns as I have sought to highlight in this article. Such neoliberalisation of 
bioethics can prove problematic because we have to ask, as Richard Ashcroft does, 
whether “major public investment in technologies which can only benefit a tiny 
minority of the already advantaged is just”.38 
 
There is also a more general problem with the concept of human enhancement itself 
when considering a status quo bias. The only point to enhancement, in person-
affecting terms, is if the enhanced trait remains the same for everyone else and that 
the trait is a contestable attribute in which bias already operates; otherwise why 
enhance if there is no benefit? Beneficial aspects of enhancement come from the bias 
that already exists in the socio-technical context in which the enhancement is made. 
For example, intelligence is only worth enhancing if it provides a benefit, but it is 
only beneficial because of existing social bias. Thus intelligent people get to work in 
nice environments for nice organizations in nice occupations. The rhetoric used by 
enhancement supporters has to be considered in light of these issues as well as the 
economistic turn in ethical discourse that accompanies the focus on means (eg, 
rational decision-making) rather than ends in such debates.39 
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